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Financing of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire

Budget performance report of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

Appropriation for 2015/16	$402,794,300
Expenditure for 2015/16	$354,114,000
Unencumbered balance for 2015/16	$48,680,300
Appropriation for 2016/17	$171,937,800
Projected expenditure for 2016/17[a]	$168,768,600
Projected underexpenditure for 2016/17[a]	$3,169,200

[a] Estimates as at 28 February 2017.

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I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the budget performance report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 (A/71/732). During its consideration of the report, the Advisory Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 21 April 2017.

2. The mandate of UNOCI was established by the Security Council in its resolution 1528 (2004) of 27 February 2004 and extended, most recently, until 30 June 2017, by the Council in its resolution 2284 (2016) of 28 April 2016, in which the Council requested the Secretary-General to complete the withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian components, other than those required for the mandate of the Operation, by 30 April 2017, and to complete the closure of the Operation in the period from 1 May to 30 June 2017.

3. The Advisory Committee recalls that in accordance with General Assembly resolution 69/258 B, the appropriation for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 was reduced by an amount of $15,447,500, to $402,794,300 gross ($395,517,400 net).

II. Budget performance for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016

4. Information with respect to the mandate performance of the Operation is provided in paragraphs 4 to 7 of the performance report (A/71/732). The Secretary-General indicates that the total expenditures for the maintenance of the Operation for 2015/16 amounted to $354,114,000, compared with the total amount of $402,794,300 gross appropriated under the terms of General Assembly resolution 69/258 B, representing an 87.9 per cent gross budget implementation rate. Detailed information on the budget implementation of the Operation is provided in paragraphs 8 to 21 of the performance report.

5. The Secretary-General provided information on resource performance for the Operation for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 in section III of that report, which contains a summary of financial resources, redeployments across groups, monthly expenditure patterns, other revenue and adjustments, expenditure for contingent-owned equipment, and the value of non-budgeted contributions.

6. An analysis of variances is provided in section IV of the report of the Secretary-General. The report indicates that the net underexpenditure is attributable to reduced requirements under all three groups of expenditure: (a) military and police personnel ($23,186,900, or 10.8 per cent), resulting from a reduction in the authorized ceiling of the military component, in accordance with Security Council resolution 2260 (2016) of 20 January 2016 and higher actual vacancy rates, due to earlier-than-planned repatriation of military contingents; (b) civilian personnel ($4,421,900, or 5.4 per cent), resulting from higher actual vacancy rates for international staff, United Nations Volunteers and government-provided personnel; and (c) operational costs ($21,071,500, or 20 per cent), attributable mainly to the lower cost of petrol, oil and lubricants; lower expenses for utilities and waste disposal services and maintenance services; and reduced requirements under the acquisition of engineering supplies and generators. Variances also occurred as a result of the depreciation of the value of the CFA franc in relation to the United

States dollar (planned rate of 1 United States dollar = 538.3 XOF, compared with the actual average rate of 1 United States dollar = 593.75 XOF).

7. Information provided by the Secretary-General indicates that an amount of $16,149,200 was apportioned under national staff and that expenditures totalled $19,624,200, representing an overexpenditure of $3,475,000, or 21.5 per cent. The Advisory Committee noted that the Secretary-General's report had explained that the variance was attributable primarily to the higher actual average grade level of NPO-C, step 5, with respect to National Professional Officers, and G-5, Step 4, for national General Service, in respect of staff on board the mission, compared with NPO-B, step 1, and G-4, step 7, respectively, provided for in the budget. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the increased expenditures was due to the net salary for the National Professional Officer at a grade/step of NOB/6, or XOF 2,085,667 ($3,521), although the amount applied in the 2016/17 budget was XOF 1,358,174 ($2,294), which led to an actual overexpenditure of 53 per cent during the 2016/17 period. **The Advisory Committee is of the view that the information on expenditures for the increased staff costs still lacks clarity and trusts that additional information will be provided to the General Assembly during its consideration of the Secretary-General's performance report.**

8. The Secretary-General's report indicates that an amount of $1,296,400 was apportioned under medical and that expenditures for the 2015/16 period were $798,800, resulting in an underexpenditure of $497,600, or 38.4 per cent less than the apportioned amount. The Advisory Committee was also informed, upon enquiry, that lower expenditures under medical were attributable to (a) the delayed procurement of medical supplies, laboratory costs, dental drugs and consumables, some of which are not available within system contracts; (b) reduced requirements for blood packs, drugs, medical kits and consumables resulting from the lower number of clinics operated and maintained due to the reduction of military personnel within the context of the overall drawdown of the Operation; and (c) pending reimbursement for yellow fever vaccines for the military contingent from troop-contributing countries. With regard to the reimbursement process for troop-contributing countries for vaccines, the Committee was informed that the mission reviews the claim submitted by the Government and, once the claim has been verified, the mission submits it to Headquarters for reimbursement. **Noting the special case for direct reimbursement for yellow fever vaccines as currently specified in the Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual), the Advisory Committee is of the view that an update on this matter should be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the Secretary-General's report.**

Incorrect reporting of expenditures

9. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information indicating that some expenditures had been recorded incorrectly, under classes other than those for which they had been budgeted, leading to the report of variances in the performance report. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the reported underexpenditure of $208,300 (41.1 per cent) under consultants was due in part to the fact that expenditures for individual contractors, which had been initially budgeted under training consultants and facilities and infrastructure, were recorded incorrectly under consultants (non-training). **The Advisory Committee is concerned that the incorrect recording of expenditures hinders a proper comparison and analysis of expenditure patterns.** The Committee's observations

and comments on this issue are also contained in its report on cross-cutting issues related to peacekeeping operations (A/71/836).

10. The Secretary-General's report notes that the total amount of $65,223,900 comprises the unencumbered balance of $48,680,300 with respect to the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 and other income amounting to $16,543,600 from interest income ($993,400), other/miscellaneous income ($1,325,300) and cancellation of prior-period obligations ($14,224,900). Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that, as at 22 March 2017, unliquidated obligations for the 2015/16 period amounted to $13,854,800.

Matters pertaining to the report of the Board of Auditors

11. In considering the report of the Secretary-General on the financing of UNOCI, the Advisory Committee had before it the report of the Board of Auditors on the accounts of the United Nations peacekeeping operations for the financial period ended 30 June 2016 (A/71/5 (Vol. II)). In its report, the Board observed that the Operation was one of four missions with the highest variances between budget and expenditure. The Board also made observations and recommendations pertaining to UNOCI on the following matters: instances of assets fully depreciated but still in use; long outstanding inter-agency accounts receivable; and use of redeployments.

12. Further comments of the Advisory Committee on the information presented in the budget performance report (A/71/732) can be found, where relevant, in the discussion of the current period in section III below.

III. Information on performance for the current period

A. Mandate and planned results

13. In his report, the Secretary-General recalled that the Security Council, by its resolution 2284 (2016) of 28 April 2016, extended the mandate of UNOCI for a final period until 30 June 2017. By the same resolution, the Council: (a) requested the Secretary-General to complete, by 30 April 2017, the withdrawal of all uniformed and civilian components other than those required for the mandate of the Organization (para. 17); and (b) decided that from 1 May to 30 June 2017, the mandate of UNOCI would be to complete the closure of the Operation (para. 18).

14. As noted in the report of the Advisory Committee (A/71/676, para. 7), the Operation has been working to conclude its remaining activities while also transitioning residual functions to the Government, the United Nations country team and partners, and liquidating the Operation. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the process of transitioning had begun after the signing of the UNOCI handover plan on 17 October 2016. The Committee was also informed that the handover plan covers six critical elements, namely (a) social cohesion; (b) human rights and transitional justice; (c) security sector reform; (d) disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, weapons management and civilian disarmament; (e) defence, security and law enforcement; and (f) communication (specifically related to the radio station UNOCI FM).

15. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was also informed that civilian administrative staff are being separated from the Operation before the closure of accounts, and tasks are being outsourced to the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda, and Headquarters.

B. Financial position of UNOCI

16. In its resolution 71/271, the General Assembly decided to appropriate to the Special Account for UNOCI the amount of $171,937,848 for the maintenance of the Operation for the period from 1 July 2016 to 30 June 2017, inclusive of the amount of $153,046,000 previously authorized for the Operation for the period from 1 July to 31 December 2016 under the terms of Assembly resolution 70/272.

17. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, as at 3 April 2017, a total of $5,917,751,400 had been assessed on Member States in respect of the Operation since its inception. The Committee was also informed that payments received as of the same date amounted to $5,889,042,800, leaving an outstanding balance of $28,708,600. As at 3 April 2017, the cash position of the Operation was $91,942,800, which was sufficient to cover the three-month operating cash reserve of $34,499,700.

18. **The Advisory Committee notes the repeated calls by the General Assembly for all Member States to pay their financial obligations on time, in full and without conditions, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (Assembly resolutions 70/247, 70/271 and 70/285). The Committee also reiterates that the Secretary-General should identify solutions to the problem of late payment of assessed contributions, including by engaging more actively with Member States (see A/70/742/Add.3, para. 9).**

19. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that as at 31 December 2016, payments to troop-contributing countries for standard troop reimbursement costs in the amount of $68,868,900 were made for the period from January to October 2016, and that an amount of $8,916,365 was paid on 15 March for the period from 1 November 2016 to 31 January 2017. For the period from January to September 2016, payments in the amount of $40,436,200 were made for contingent-owned equipment reimbursements, leaving the balance owed as at 31 December 2016 in the amount of $5,723,900. An additional amount of $4,887,731 was paid on 20 March 2017 for the period from 1 October to 31 December 2016.

20. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that with respect to death and disability compensation since the inception of the Operation, an amount of $5,802,500 had been paid in respect of 147 claims as at March 2017. The Committee was informed that there were seven pending claims. **The Advisory Committee trusts that all outstanding claims will be settled expeditiously.**

21. The Advisory Committee was also informed that as at 28 February 2017, the incumbency of the Operation was as follows:

Category	*Authorized/ approved*[a]	*Planned (average)*[b]	*Actual (average)*	*Average vacancy rate (percentage)*
Military observers	192	112	93	17
Military contingent personnel	3 808	2 139	1 747	18
United Nations police personnel	500	406	250	38
Formed police personnel	1 000	1 000	366	63
International staff	251	228	208	9
National staff	545	421	395	6
United Nations Volunteers	89	73	64	12

[a] Represents the highest authorized strength for the period for military and police personnel and the approved posts for civilian personnel.

[b] Represents the average authorized strength pursuant to Security Council resolution 2284 (2016) for military personnel and the drawdown plan for civilian staff.

22. The Advisory Committee was provided with a table showing current and projected expenditure for the 2016/17 period, including reasons for variances. The estimated expenditure as at 28 February 2017 amounted to $141,303,200. At the close of the mission (30 June 2017), the estimated total expenditure would amount to $168,768,700, leaving a projected unencumbered balance of $3,169,100. Upon enquiry, the Committee was provided with information that indicated that the balance of accounts receivable (from other United Nations agencies) as at 6 April 2017 amounted to $163,341.

C. Liquidation activities, restoration and environmental clearance

23. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that all liabilities to date are reflected in the books and records of the Operation and that the present available cash balance in the special account of UNOCI is sufficient to meet the recorded liabilities to all troop- and formed police-contributing countries.

24. With regard to assets, the Advisory Committee was also informed that the mission expects to transfer assets valued at $11.5 million to another mission; transfer assets valued at $710,000 to the Department of Safety and Security; and sell assets valued at nearly $7 million. **The Advisory Committee expects that the liquidation of assets will be conducted in compliance with regulation 5.14 of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations (see also A/71/676, para. 38).**

25. In his report, the Secretary-General notes that in light of the accelerated closure period, there is a possibility that unforeseen liabilities may arise after 30 June 2017, as obligations to Governments for troops, formed police units, logistical support and other goods supplied and services rendered remain valid for a five-year period. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the principal factors that may give rise to unforeseen liabilities include staff-related payments, claims by troop- and police-contributing countries, mandated activities with respect to environmental clean-up of land and other sites, and obligations to renovate the buildings and facilities so as to restore them to their original condition.

Education grant and environmental clean-up

26. With regard to education grants, upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that provisions for costs related to the education grant are included in the budget for the 2016/17 period under the common staff costs budget line for international staff, and that no claims are expected for school periods after the closure of the Operation on 30 June 2017. However, the Committee was also informed that according to rule 3.17 of the Staff Rules and Staff Regulations of the United Nations, a staff member can make a written claim to receive an education grant payment retroactively within one year following the date on which the staff member would have been entitled to the initial payment.

27. The Advisory Committee requested, but was not provided with, quantitative information on potential future liabilities. **The Advisory Committee trusts that updated quantitative information on current liabilities as well as potential outstanding education grants will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the Secretary-General's performance report.**

28. Concerning the environmental clean-up, upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with an update on environmental clean-up activities, which include removal of oil/soil contamination around generators and vehicle workshops; removal of wastewater treatment plants and associated lift stations in the ground; cleaning of septic tanks and oil/water separators; and general solid

waste pickup and disposal. The Committee was also informed that the Operation had removed approximately 100 tons of contaminated soil, mostly around fuel tanks and generators, and that costs for environmental clean-up were included under approved facilities and infrastructure resources. **The Advisory Committee trusts that the Operation will contribute lessons on environmental clean-up to the centralized repository which is being compiled to provide guidance for future mission withdrawal and closure processes.** The Committee's observations and recommendations on environmental matters can be found in its cross-cutting report on peacekeeping operations (A/71/836).

29. **The Advisory Committee reiterates that the Operation must draw lessons learned from other closed operations with a view to ensuring a timely liquidation in compliance with all applicable regulations and rules (see A/71/676).**

Unforeseen liabilities

30. Owing to the unforeseen liabilities which it is suggested by the Secretary-General may arise after the Operation's closure, the Secretary-General recommends that the unencumbered balance and other income in the total amount of $65,223,900 for the 2015/16 period be deferred until the seventy-second session of the General Assembly (A/71/732, para. 74). Noting the value of the potential sale of assets in the amount of approximately $7 million, and the remaining cash balance of $91,942,800 for the period 2016/17, and absent sufficient quantitative data concerning financial liabilities, the Advisory Committee is not convinced of the need for the Operation to retain that total amount of $65,223,900, comprising the unencumbered balance and other income for the period ended 30 June 2016. **The Advisory Committee therefore recommends that the full amount of the unencumbered balance of $48,680,300 for the 2015/16 period and other income for the period ended 30 June 2016 amounting to $16,543,600 be returned to Member States.**

III. Conclusion

31. The action to be taken by the General Assembly in connection with the budget performance report for UNOCI is contained in paragraph 74 of the report of the Secretary-General. **Taking into account its recommendations in paragraph 30 above, the Advisory Committee recommends that the unencumbered balance of $48,680,300 for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 July 2016 and other income for the period ended 30 June 2016 amounting to $16,543,600 be credited to Member States in full and without delay.**

Documentation

- Budget performance of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire for the period from1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 (A/71/732)
- Reports of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/71/676 and A/70/742/Add.13)
- Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the cross-cutting issues related to United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/71/836)

- **Financial report and audited financial statements for the 12-month period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016 and report of the Board of Auditors, Volume II, United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/71/5 (Vol. II))**
- **General Assembly resolutions 70/272 and 71/271**
- **Security Council resolutions 2260 (2016) and 2284 (2016)**

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General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 34
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Identical letters dated 20 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I transmit to you herewith a statistical summary of Israeli violations of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) committed during the month of March 2017 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the seventy-first session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 20 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary General and the President of the Security Council

Land violations committed during March 2017

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
1 March	0930	A number of townspeople headed toward the outskirts of the town of Mays al-Jabal in the Kurum al-Shiraqi area, opposite points B64-1 and B65, to ensure that the Israeli enemy had removed certain devices (a camera, a solar panel and a microwave link network) that had been installed there previously. From the enemy side, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Hummer vehicles approached. Five soldiers disembarked and threw a smoke bomb in the direction of the townspeople, which landed between the technical fence and the Blue Line. At 1000 hours, the people left and the enemy patrol returned into occupied territory.
	1830 1845	From its position opposite Labbunah-Jall al-Alam, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight in the direction of Lebanese territory.
2 March	2030 2145	From its position opposite Labbunah-Jall al-Alam, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight in the direction of Lebanese territory.
6 March	2155	From its position opposite Labbunah-Jall al-Alam, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight in the direction of a Humvee vehicle belonging to the Lebanese Army while it was moving from the Ra's al-Naqurah position to the Labbunah position.
26 March	2240	From inside occupied territory, opposite Sahl al-Khiyam, a 10-vehicle Israeli enemy patrol approached. Five soldiers disembarked, inspected the technical fence and directed a searchlight in the direction of Lebanese territory. The vehicles and soldiers departed at 2310 hours into occupied territory.
27 March	1000	From inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, from its position at the Zabdin post, the Israeli enemy hurled two smoke bombs at the surrounding area.
	2148 2158	From inside the occupied Shab'a Farms, the Israeli enemy launched six flares over the Radar position.
28 March	0800	From inside occupied territory, opposite the Sahl al-Khiyam highway and near crossing point B90, an Israeli enemy patrol comprising two Defender vehicles and two bulldozers approached. Twelve soldiers disembarked and trained their weapons on Lebanese territory. The bulldozers cleared the road adjacent to the technical fence. At 1230 hours, the work finished and the soldiers departed, leaving the bulldozers in place.

Sea violations committed in March 2017

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
5 March	1225	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy rubber military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) of 1 October 2011, proceeding some 100 metres into Lebanese territorial waters over a fifteen-minute period and releasing two divers. The launch and divers then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
	1225	An Israeli military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 15-minute period and proceeded on its way for some 100 metres. At 1240 hours, it moved in the direction of buoys Nos. 3 and 4 and breached that line for a 39-minute period. It then proceeded some 370 metres and released two divers inside Lebanese territorial waters, before leaving in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
6 March	2120 2128	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch fired several bursts of medium-weapons fire and tracer rounds in the direction of Lebanese territorial waters. Some rounds violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011).
7 March	0435	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch fired weapons and directed a searchlight for a five-minute period in the direction of Lebanese territorial waters.
	0450 0500	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from its position at Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters and at a Lebanese fishing boat multiple times, for one minute each time.
	0607	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 315 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1555	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a one-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 260 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
9 March	0740	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a seven-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 590 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
9 March	0815	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 33-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left occupied Palestinian territorial waters, and returned at 0850 hours. It breached the above-mentioned line for an eight-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 560 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0825	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a period of one hour and five minutes, and proceeded on its way for some 650 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0850	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for an eight-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 560 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Date	Time	Nature of violation
	0908	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 22-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 560 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1507	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1617	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a one-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
15 March	1910	An Israeli enemy military launch released divers into Palestinian territorial waters. The vessel's crew spoke in Hebrew on a loudspeaker and directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period. At 1930 hours, the launch left in the direction of occupied Palestinian waters.
19 March	1638	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a three-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 300 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
22 March	1120	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 24-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 150 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then departed into occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1133 hours, the launch returned and breached the boundary for 28-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 370 metres into Lebanese territorial waters, where it released divers who removed the third buoy. It then departed into occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1232 hours, it returned and violated the boundary again for a 44-minute period, proceeding some 315 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. It then departed into occupied Palestinian territorial waters. At 1256 hours, it returned and violated the boundary for a 20-minute period, proceeding on its way for some 315 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. It released divers, who reinstalled the third buoy in its previous location. The launch and divers then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian waters.
	1434	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 26-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 200 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then departed into occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1437	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 33-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 370 metres into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then departed into occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
24 March	0610	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, from inside occupied Palestinian waters, the crew of an Israeli enemy military launch shouted obscenities at Lebanese fishermen inside Lebanese territorial waters. The launch also sounded warning sirens next to the first buoy.
25 March	2340	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, the Israeli enemy directed a searchlight from its Ra's al-Naqurah position towards Lebanese territorial waters for a five-minute period.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
26 March	1811	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a one-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 150 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
29 March	0312	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a seven-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 335 metres. It directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a one-minute period. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0337	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a nine-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 408 metres. It directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of two minutes. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0410	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, inside occupied Palestinian territorial waters, an Israeli enemy military launch fired five rounds in the air and directed a searchlight towards Lebanese territorial waters for a period of five minutes.
	0411	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree 6433 (2011) for a nine-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 445 metres. A crew member released an explosive charge from the launch into Lebanese territorial waters. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	0506	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a six-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 390 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.
	1056	Off Ra's al-Naqurah, an Israeli enemy military launch violated the southern maritime boundary established by Decree No. 6433 (2011) for a 31-minute period, and proceeded on its way for some 371 metres. The launch then left in the direction of occupied Palestinian territorial waters.

Air violations committed in March 2017

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
2 March	0955	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1140 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1425	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They left Lebanese airspace at 1435 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	1435	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Shikka. They left Lebanese airspace at 1445 hours over Rumaysh.
4 March	0600	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled above the Shuf, Iqlim al-Kharrub, the South, the Western Bekaa, Riyaq and Zahlah before leaving at 1900 hours over Kafr Killa.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
5 March	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1345 hours over Rumaysh.
6 March	0800	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1415 hours over Alma al Sha'b.
	1000	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1255 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1005	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1135 hours over Naqurah.
	1010	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese territory, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1600 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1035	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Na'imah. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1205 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	1150	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 1330 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	2020	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2035 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
7 March	1105	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1940 hours over Rumaysh.
8 March	0750	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over the South before leaving at 1600 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0805	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1300 hours over Rumaysh.
9 March	0945	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Ba'abda, Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 2025 hours over Rumaysh.
14 March	0740	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Ba'abda, Beirut and its suburbs, the South and the Western Bekaa before leaving at 1630 hours over Kafr Killa.
	2040	Two Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea off Shikka. They circled over all regions of Lebanon before leaving at 2055 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
17 March	0234	Four Israeli enemy warplanes violated Lebanese airspace at low altitude, entering over the South before leaving in the direction of occupied territory.
21 March	2045	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs and the South before leaving at 0050 hours on 22 March 2017 over Naqurah.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
23 March	2035	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2305 hours over Rumaysh.
24 March	1120	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1600 hours over Rumaysh.
25 March	0730	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1400 hours over Rumaysh.
	1700	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Beirut and its suburbs before leaving at 0730 hours on 26 March 2017 over Naqurah.
26 March	0720	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1235 hours over the sea west of Naqurah.
	0840	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and its suburbs, Kasrawan, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 1500 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0905	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 1520 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1130	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 1930 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1920	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the Western Bekaa and the South before leaving at 0015 hours on 27 March over Rumaysh.
27 March	0530	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut and Ba'abda before leaving at 1740 hours over Naqurah.
	0725	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Kafr Killa. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 1410 hours over Kafr Killa.
	1045 1100	Two Israeli enemy helicopters violated Lebanese airspace. They circled over the occupied Shab'a Farms before leaving at 1100 hours in the direction of occupied territory.
28 March	0430	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over the Shuf, Iqlim al-Kharrub, Beirut and its suburbs and Ba'abda before leaving at 1200 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	0500	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 1800 hours over Rumaysh.
	0950	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Naqurah. It circled over Beirut, Matn and Ba'abda before leaving at 1500 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	1910	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over Riyaq, Baalbek and Hirmil before leaving at 0700 hours on 29 March over Rumaysh.

Date	*Time*	*Nature of violation*
29 March	0725	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South, Riyaq and Baalbek before leaving at 1850 hours over Naqurah.
	1515	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over the sea west of Naqurah. It circled over the South before leaving at 2320 hours over Alma al-Sha'b.
	2145	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 0530 hours on 30 March over Alma al-Sha'b.
31 March	1415	An Israeli enemy reconnaissance aircraft violated Lebanese airspace, entering over Alma al-Sha'b. It circled over the South before leaving at 2050 hours over Naqurah.

United Nations A/71/888

General Assembly

Distr.: General
3 May 2017

Original: English

Seventy-first session
Agenda item 81
Status of the Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and relating to the protection of victims of armed conflicts

Letter dated 27 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Switzerland, in its capacity as the depositary of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, runs the secretariat of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission. In this capacity, I have the honour to transmit to you a letter from the President of the Commission, Thilo Marauhn (see annex).*

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 81.

(*Signed*) Jürg **Lauber**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* The annex is being circulated in the language of submission only.

17-07041 (E) 050517

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 27 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Letter dated 18 April 2017 from the President of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission addressed to the President of the General Assembly

Availability of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission

I have the honour to report to you that, following the 2016 diplomatic meeting of the States accepting the competence of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission, held pursuant to article 90 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, the Commission held its annual meeting in Geneva from 20 to 22 February 2017. At the meeting, the new members of the governing body of the Commission — the Bureau — were elected, and I was personally bestowed with the honour of presiding over the Commission for the next three years.

In this capacity I reiterate to you — and through your agency to all States Members of the General Assembly — the Commission's commitment to contributing to peace and international security by discharging its competences under article 90 of Additional Protocol I. These include not only fact-finding processes but also wide-ranging good offices to foster an attitude of respect for international humanitarian law.

To promote better knowledge of its legal capacities and confidence-building potential, the Commission stands ready to, inter alia, participate in a thematic debate of the General Assembly. Such a debate could be included in the Assembly's agenda in view of the fortieth anniversary of the adoption of Additional Protocol I. A formal description of such potential and capacities has been provided in an aide-memoire (see enclosure).

I therefore kindly ask you to distribute the present letter and the enclosure as a document of the General Assembly.

(*Signed*) Thilo **Marauhn**
President of the International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission

Enclosure

International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission

To secure the guarantees afforded to the victims of armed conflicts, article 90 of the Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts, provides for the establishment of an international fact-finding commission. The International Humanitarian Fact-Finding Commission was subsequently established in 1991. It is a permanent body of 15 independent experts, acting in their personal capacity, elected by the States having made a declaration of recognition under article 90 of Additional Protocol I. The Commission's essential purpose is to contribute to implementing and ensuring respect for international humanitarian law in armed conflict situations.

The Commission fulfils its mandate by:

(a) Enquiring into any facts alleged to be grave breaches or serious violations of international humanitarian law;

(b) Facilitating through its good offices the restoration of an attitude of respect for the Conventions and Additional Protocol I;

(c) Reporting its findings to the States involved and making such recommendations as it deems appropriate.

In the fulfilment of its mandate, the Commission observes the principles of neutrality, independence, impartiality and confidentiality. In its capacity as the depositary of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols thereto, Switzerland runs the secretariat of the Commission. Each State that has recognized the competence of the Commission has the right to refer for investigation situations of armed conflict to the Commission on the condition that all parties involved have equally recognized the Commission's competence. A State party to Additional Protocol I may make a comprehensive declaration, thereby recognizing the Commission's competence, or it may consent to an investigation into the facts of a particular dispute. A comprehensive declaration can be made at any time.

Currently, 76 States have made a comprehensive declaration under article 90.

The special added value of the Commission is that it combines the following qualities:

(a) It is the only permanent and treaty-based international body for international humanitarian law fact-finding and good offices;

(b) It focuses on confidence-building between the parties and on prevention of the recurrence of breaches of international humanitarian law;

(c) As a State-driven process, it provides an avenue for States to demonstrate their commitment to ensuring respect for international humanitarian law;

(d) Commission members act on the basis of their individual expertise and professional portfolios;

(e) The Commission acts impartially, independently and confidentially;

(f) It limits itself to making recommendations to the parties to the conflict; it is not a court of law and therefore it does not issue judicial decisions.

For further information, visit www.ihffc.org.

United Nations A/71/889–S/2017/349

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
1 May 2017
English
Original: Russian

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 108
Measures to eliminate international terrorism

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 24 April 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of an analysis entitled "Best practices in countering suicide terrorism" prepared by the Meeting of Heads of Special Services, Security Agencies and Law Enforcement Organizations (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council, and of the General Assembly under item 108 of the agenda.

(*Signed*) P. **Iliichev**
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

17-06973 (E) 030517 080517

Please recycle

Annex to the letter dated 24 April 2017 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

[Original: English and Russian]

Meeting of Heads of Special Services, Security Agencies, and Law-Enforcement Organizations

Best practices in countering suicide terrorism

As of today, terrorism is still posing a persistent threat to the security of individual persons, society and the State. The tactic of using suicide operatives in terrorist attacks has become a common phenomenon in different parts of the world.

The following suicide attack scenarios are the most common:

- attacks planned and perpetrated by stand-alone terrorists ("lone wolves") whose motivations may vary as they are conditioned by the extent of individual radicalization and susceptibility to pseudo-ideology;
- terrorist attacks masterminded and operationally directed from within the ranks of international terrorist organizations based abroad (in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere) and perpetrated by operatives purposely deployed from the ongoing conflict zone to their countries of origin after having gained subversive expertise when fighting on the side of international terrorist groups;
- terrorist attacks masterminded and operationally directed from abroad (Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan etc.), and perpetrated by one or several sleeper cells whose members do not yet have combat experience with international terrorist organizations;
- terrorist attacks perpetrated by one or several individuals, either related or personally acquainted, who form the mainstay of small groups striving for credibility with leaders of international terrorist organizations as a guarantee of future deployment to a conflict zone abroad.

Some terrorist organizations view this tactic as one of the most effective instruments for attaining political goals. The spectacular terrorist attacks in New York (11 September 2001), Paris (13 November 2015) and Istanbul (12 January 2016), in which a suicide element was involved, are examples of that.

It is also of note that many of the modern-day terrorist organizations have been actively seeking chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons or related components; due to that circumstance, the possibility of suicide operatives being deployed in combination with the use of materials of this kind should never be ruled out.

An analysis of best practices derived from the routine experience of a number of national counterterrorism stakeholders was helpful in forming a comprehensive view of how security, intelligence and law-enforcement authorities counteract the practice of "suicide terror", which is so widespread among international terrorist organizations nowadays.

1. Those most susceptible to the ideology of ethnically- and religiously-motivated violence are: young people with an "underdeveloped" world view, who are inapt or reluctant to get integrated into society; individuals coming from socially-unprotected strata, whose urge to be involved with terrorism could be explained by a desire to support their relatives financially and materially with

incentives provided by terrorist organizations, rather than by religious fanaticism; and individuals previously convicted of committing serious crimes. Together, they form a recruitment base for terrorist organizations. According to **Kazakh** experts, youth is most susceptible to the ideology of ethnically- and religiously-motivated violence. Individuals of this category often develop radical views due to their belonging to socially-vulnerable ethnic groups/minorities of low socioeconomic status, combined with a lack of self-actualization opportunities and religious illiteracy.

2. The individuals most typically selected for carrying out suicide missions may be basically categorized as: adherents to extremist religious teachings; supporters of right-wing radical and leftist organizations; separatists; and relatives of killed militants who, according to "blood feud" traditions as well as religious dogmas instilled by extremists, have a personal obligation to avenge their kinsmen. According to **Sudanese** experts, despite the difficulty of uncovering those people, professionalism and accumulative experience can help in doing so.

3. The following methods and techniques are most commonly used by terrorist organizations for the purpose of recruitment (including in a suicide operative capacity): sparking religious and ethnic intolerance; ideological indoctrination, including from a remote location (either by telephone or via the Internet); portraying terrorists in a positive light; material incentives; and creating a certain image of a perceived enemy. According to experts of the **People's Republic of China**'s Ministry of Public Security, terrorist organizations typically use Internet-based facilities for the dissemination of audio and video materials or musical recordings for the purposes of recruitment; Internet-based forums/platforms as well as mobile communications features are also used directly, when making contacts with recruitment targets or for other operational purposes. Terrorist recruiters gradually instill terrorism/extremism-supportive views in the mind of a target/"martyr" candidate, who is also being tactically instructed and directed to carry out a suicide mission afterwards.

4. The main factors facilitating the emergence and spread of suicide terrorism are as follows:

(a) terrorist groups and their financial benefactors, being keenly interested in promoting suicide terrorism, allocate considerable funds for the selection and training of *shaheeds* (martyrs), given that their attacks normally receive the broadest coverage in the media, evoking general panic and producing a negative impact on public morale; moreover, incidents of this type are very difficult to investigate; as **Romanian** experts pointed out, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) chooses this modus operandi in Syria and Iraq to have overall control and uses terror to achieve this purpose;

(b) experienced terrorists apply previously-tested selection ("talent spotting"), recruitment and training techniques with respect to prospective candidates for suicide missions, and also employ special methods of psychological indoctrination at the training camps set up for that purpose. According to **Serbian** experts, apart from a classical recruitment approach, based on exploiting the personal vulnerabilities of the members of a specific target group, terrorist organizations, relying on direct contacts via the mass-media and the Internet (social networks), as well as mobile messaging services, are finding ample opportunities to evoke the sympathies of certain individuals who are to be radicalized and recruited as suicide operatives;

(c) a growing number of individuals have an explicit desire to commit a suicide bombing attack, influenced by ongoing conflicts in Syria, Iraq or Afghanistan, broad dissemination of radical religious ideology, widespread video-

and audio-propaganda of terrorist attacks perpetrated by suicide operatives, along with a variety of other motivational factors typical of persons determined to commit suicide (living below the poverty line, incurable disease, depression, serious mental disorder, revenge etc.). According to **Hungarian** experts, as a result of radicalization via the Internet, there has been a significant increase in the number of people holding extremist views who can be trained by the terrorist organizations to commit suicide attacks, since they are not suitable for performing tasks requiring a higher level of capabilities.

5. The principal sources of financing of the international terrorist organizations making use of suicide operatives are: self-financing, based on the ISIL model (oil trade, levying taxes upon the population, smuggling, kidnappings for ransom); external support from state actors/governments exploiting terrorists as tools in attaining political goals; private donations (on the part of terrorist "sponsors", relatives of terrorists etc.). According to **Spanish** experts, in respect of this issue a distinction needs to be made between funding received from conflict zones, where terrorists operate more or less freely, and resources received from the West, where they are forced to develop a system of illegal money collection, including inside the Muslim community, and must hide its true purpose, which is to provide funds to terrorist groups.

6. The principal means of counteracting the use of suicide operatives by international terrorist organizations are as follows: promotion of international cooperation; improvement of counterterrorism legislation; countering the spread of terrorism-supportive ideology; timely identification of individuals with the potential for the commission of suicide attacks; elimination of conditions facilitating the spread of terrorism (preventive diplomacy or public outreach). **Slovene** experts, referring to the principal means of counteracting suicide terrorism, mentioned effective cooperation of all competent institutions at the national level as well as active and close international cooperation in the fight against terrorism. According to experts from the **United Arab Emirates**, the prohibition of suicide in Islam is an important means of institutional counteraction.

7. The following measures are believed to be the most effective in terms of counteracting terrorist groups and organizations making use of suicide operatives: expanding the scope of international cooperation facilitating the design of mechanisms for joint counterterrorist activities; developing a zero tolerance attitude towards terrorism among the general public, while broadening opportunities for receiving counterterrorism-related information from the public; organizing effective counteraction of the use of the Internet by international terrorist organizations as a medium of propaganda, proselytism and recruitment; detection and suppression of the activities carried out by emissaries (foreign agents) of international terrorist organizations, while endeavouring to discredit these activities; and building stronger capabilities for the proactive suppression of terrorist plots. According to **Slovak** experts, the most effective measures include strengthening international cooperation of security and intelligence services, sharing information on the use of the latest information technologies by terrorists, de-radicalization programmes, increasing public awareness and uncovering trafficking in arms.

8. The measures found to be most effective in terms of countering citizens' involvement in terrorist activity in a suicide operative capacity are as follows: strengthening cooperation with governments of foreign States and non-governmental organizations; improving basic standards of living and education of the population; imposing harsher regulatory and legal restrictions with respect to individuals involved in the preparation for and perpetration of suicide terrorist attacks; fostering the efforts of civil society institutions focused on enhancing public awareness of terrorism-related threats ("conscience awakening"); counter-propaganda activities

conducted on a regular basis and on a large scale; thwarting of efforts to exert an ideological influence on society; and exercising supervisory control over the education of imams and designing a set of criteria for assessing the level of their compliance with professional requirements. According to **Bulgarian** experts, measures for prevention of radicalization should include the involvement of educational institutions, social services, denominations, local authorities and communities, as well as counteraction of the narrative of terrorist organizations. Another important measure is a systematic enhancement of the expert capacity of law-enforcement bodies and intelligence and security services in the identification of terrorists, achieved through training, drills and information exchange and sharing of experience with partner services.

Thus, an impressive system of measures to counter suicide terrorism is being developed today. However, in view of the actual level of threats posed by this type of terrorism, which remains persistently high, there is a necessity to continue building on efforts in this regard.

Given that it is practically impossible to effectively forestall the actions of a suicide operative at the stage of perpetration of an attack, and the consequences of every "successful" attack are typically devastating, the primary efforts should be focused on preventive outreach work within the social milieus from which the ranks of suicide terrorists are replenished, as well as on detecting any indications pointing at preparations for terrorist attacks against specific targets. In this context, the activity of security and intelligence agencies should be based on an integrated approach, encompassing all the elements of the relevant system of countermeasures, namely: general (proactive) prevention of suicide terrorism; measures aimed specifically at the detection and suppression of terrorist activity involving a suicide element; and implementation of other measures of a managerial, institutional, legal and operational type as appropriate.

Most of the partners share the view that counteracting suicide terrorism necessitates drawing on the entire potential of security, intelligence, law-enforcement and other authorities participating in counterterrorism, as well as of civil society at the national, regional and, most importantly, international levels.

United Nations A/71/890–S/2017/353

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
28 April 2017
English
Original: Spanish

General Assembly
Seventy-first session
Agenda item 58
Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples

Security Council
Seventy-second year

Letter dated 25 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith a resolution of the National Assembly of Ecuador expressing concern with regard to the continuing violation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of the Sahrawi people and calling for implementation of Security Council resolution 690 (1991) concerning the establishment of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara and the organization of a referendum to allow the people of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would circulate this letter and its annex as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 58, and of the Security Council, under the item entitled "The situation concerning Western Sahara".

(*Signed*) Horacio **Sevilla Borja**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Ecuador

17-06901 (E) 040517 040517

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Annex to the letter dated 25 April 2017 from the Permanent Representative of Ecuador to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

National Assembly of the Republic of Ecuador

The plenary,

Whereas

Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations states that it is a purpose of the United Nations to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples solemnly proclaims the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in all its forms and manifestations and declares that all peoples have the right to self-determination, whereby they may freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and that immediate steps shall be taken, in occupied territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom;

On 30 August 1988, the Kingdom of Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro accepted the settlement proposals presented by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the then current Chairman of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity;

The Security Council, in its resolution 690 (1991) of 29 April 1991, decided to establish, under the authority of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, a United Nations mission to organize, in cooperation with the Organization of African Unity, a referendum for self-determination of the people of Western Sahara, in accordance with the report of the Secretary-General of 19 April 1991 (S/22464);

On 8 February 2006, the joint communiqué on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Republic of Ecuador and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic entered into force;

Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights establishes the right to life, liberty and security of person, and article 9 establishes that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile;

It is the duty of States to condemn any subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation, in order to guarantee fundamental human rights, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, and reaffirm their commitment to global peace and cooperation;

On Friday, 18 March 2016, the Government of Morocco demanded the departure of the civilian component of the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which had been established following the approval by the Security Council of the report of the Secretary-General of 18 June 1990 (S/21360). The essential aim of the proposals by the Secretary-General of the United Nations is to enable the people of the Territory of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination and independence, by organizing a transition period starting with the entry into force of the ceasefire and ending with the announcement of

the results of the referendum. So that a referendum may be organized, Morocco undertakes to effect an appropriate, substantial and phased reduction of its troops in Western Sahara;

In 2013, 25 persons were sentenced to prison terms ranging from 25 years to life imprisonment for the events that occurred in the Gdim Izik camp, located on the outskirts of Laayoune, the dismantling of which ended in the tragic killing of civilians in 2011. Since Tuesday, 1 March 2016, 13 of the 25 prisoners have gone on hunger strike in the Salé prison near Rabat, demanding their release;

In exercise of its constitutional and legal powers,

Hereby resolves to

Article 1 — Express concern about the ongoing subjugation of the Sahrawi people, the violation of their human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the illegal exploitation of their natural resources for over 40 years, which might well constitute a breach of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.

Article 2 — Call for the implementation of Security Council resolution 690 (1991), by means of which the Security Council agreed to establish a United Nations mission to organize and ensure a referendum on self-determination for the people of Western Sahara, thereby avoiding a possible return to war between the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic and the Kingdom of Morocco. It is essential to respect the will, sovereign rights and desire of a people to obtain independence. Consequently, it is suggested that the referendum process in Western Sahara should be stepped up and completed, and that the mandate of MINURSO should include the monitoring and reporting of human rights violations in Sahrawi territory.

Article 3 — Support and express solidarity with the 25 political prisoners who were convicted because of their peaceful political activism and participation in the events that occurred in the Gdim Izik camp and who have been held under arbitrary detention for five and a half years, and call for their immediate release and that of all other Sahrawi political prisoners in Morocco.

Article 4 — Express solidarity with the struggle for liberation and self-determination maintained by the Sahrawi people since 1970. The Sahrawi civilian population fled the cities of Western Sahara to the areas controlled by the Frente Polisario and, for more than 40 years, approximately 200,000 people have lived in refugee camps in Tindouf in the Republic of Algeria, awaiting a referendum on self-determination. Currently, the Sahrawi people are largely dependent on international humanitarian aid for food.

Article 5 — Communicate the present resolution to the Embassy of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic in Ecuador, so that it can inform the authorities and people of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic thereof.

Done and signed at the headquarters of the National Assembly, located in the Quito Metropolitan District, Pichincha province, on 14 April 2016.

(*Signed*) Rosana **Alvarado Carrión**
First Vice-President
Acting President

(*Signed*) Libia **Rivas Ordóñez**
Secretary-General